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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LOCAL Rl~.~T/l'Y COl\lPA~Y. I 
a <·orporahon, 
Plai'Jdiff and Appellant, 
YS. · 
\T. A. LINDQUIST and MARY ) 
LINDQFTS1', his wife, 
!Jdl'nrlants and Respomleuts. 
. I 
Xo. G004 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
rl'he brief of the rcspondentR in thiR appeal under 
Heading IT citcR hYo Utah eases whi<'h arc elaimed to 
support the eontention of respondents. These are :Mc-
Lanp;h1in vs. Park City B:mk, G:~ P. GK~J: 2:2 Ut. 4/i) (1900), 
and Carlquist vs. 'Coltharp, 248 P. 481 ; (i/ 1TL 514 (1926). 
In onr opening brief we said at pag·e 1:) that there 
are no Utah cases on the point involved, and that it 
would sc1Te no purpose to eitc or diseusR authorities in-
Yohing points whieh are not involved in this particular 
C'asc. Thus no mention is made whatsoever of these 
i \\'O cnses which are novv relied upon by respondentR. 
A ppellani resperifully snggestR that the ('onrt mnRt de-
termine ~whether these eases are or arc not in point. Iu 
this connection, however, we may observe: 
The McLaughlin case in brief involves tho rlaim of 
an attaching creditor of real property as against tho 
general receiver of the mortgagor, to proceeds of a fire 
insurance policy which were paid because of a fire which 
occurod subsequent to tho attachment, lmt prior to auy 
sale under execution. rrhe insurance poliry had been 
taken out by the receiver and he had paid the premiums: 
he had also remained in possession. It seems sound 
enough under the circumstanres that the court hold: 
1. "The real estate in controversy was rightfully 
held 'by tho receiver with the right to the usc, rents and 
profits thereof for tho benefit of the estate until Cupit 
(attaching l'reditor) shouhl acquire title by a sillo 011 hi,; 
execution.'' 
2. ~he receiver had au insurable interest in tho 
property; also tho right to usc it, receive reub; from it, 
repair it and preserve it from l'oss the same as auy other 
owner would have. 
::3. That as between tho aitaching creditor who at 
the time of the fire had not yet bought in tho property 
at execution sale, let alone o'btaiued uncouditional title 
by expiration of the period of redemption without a 
redemption, the receiver was entitled to the proceeds of 
the insurance. 
This case is brief and it is obvious in reading tho 
opinion that 8edion 104-:~7-:~7 aR it then oxiRted, wa" 
neither involved nor discussed in any way. It is in no 
sense authority either for or against. the Issues now 
before .the court in this case. 
1n the Carlquist case a receiver pendente lite was 
appointecl after the mortgagee eommenced his fore-
c·losure action. Subsequent to the execution of the mort-
gage and prior to the commencement of the foreclosure 
adion the mortgagor executed a crop mortgage covering 
crops which were growing at the time the foreclosure 
ad ion was commenced. The mort age did not contain any 
provision giving the mortgagee the right to possession or 
a lien upon the crops. The receiver harvested the crops 
and solcl them; then he turned tlJe proccecls into court 
and was discharged-all this before the elate set for the 
trial of the foreclosure proceeding, and t lms of <·om·se 
before the sale or the period for redPmption had expirNL 
The ease inYolved the eonf-licting claims of the mortgagee 
and the crop mortgagee to the proc·ecds, .m<l the court 
held that under the circumstances the crop uwrtgagec 
prevailed. This was the sole question presented on the 
appeal; the cross appeal involved subjects iu 110 possible 
way pertinent to our ease. The court said: '' rrhe mort-
gagor has, therefore, the legal title, nnrl is t>ntith·rl to 
retain possession of the premises uniil the expiration 
of the time for redemption, unless the terms of the mort-
gage give the mortgagee the right of possession." The 
case now before this court does not involve the question 
of the right of possession which is conceded; nor is the 
striet qnestion of title involved. 
There is thus nothing in the two foregoing eases 
which has any bearing whatsoever on our point, and m 
so far as these decisions are concerned they seem to 
be sound and eonsistent with plaintiff's conteution m 
this partic11lar case. 
The other matters urged in respondents' brief are 
fully covered in the opening brief of appellant and fur-
tlher discussion with respect thereto would serve no nse-
fnl purpose. Section 104-:37-37 as a matter of substan-
tive law by its plain language vests in the purc·haser at 
the sale the right not only to the rents of the property 
sold, bnt also to ''the value of the use and occupation 
thereof," despite any attempt by respondent to restrict 
the statute in its operation to "rents", and to ignore and 
disregard the part above quoted. The cases of Harris 
V·S. Reynolds and \Yalker vs. l\fcCnsker in California, 
Clifford & Company \'S. Henry in North Dakota, and 
Citi~~;ens National Bank vs. \V estern Loan & Building 
Company in Montana, all .of which are fully discussed 
in appellant's brief, hold that the mortgagor-exerution 
debtor is a "tenant in possession" under this statute, 
and sub;ject to its terms. 
Respectfully sn bmi ttecl, 
STEP! IF,NS, BRAYTON & l ,0\\"K 
and CALVIN BF,liL~, 
A tt nrn eys f nr Plain f i[/ 
rrn rl A JJJJ(>.ll ant. 
